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ABSTRACT 
The paper analyzes the process of nominal wage determination in Brazil. A wage equation is 
specif ied to capture the government's participation and the role of institutional and market factors in 
the wage bargaining of the organized and competit ive sectors of the Brazilian economy The Chow 
Test is applied to the preliminary results and then the wage equation is re-estimated using the 
Kalman's Filter Algori thm. The article's main conclusions are as follows- (a) government 's wage policy 
has been increasingly unimportant as a mechanism to guide the wage setting in Brazil; (b) the official 
min imum wage, on the other hand, has increased its importance in wage bargaining; (c) the 
' institutional factors" have been increasingly important in the process of nominal wage determination; 
and (d) the "market factor" has also worked as a relevant mechanism to steer the wage bargaining in 
Brazil 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This article analyzes in what sense the government intervention (through its 
formal wage policies), the labor's organization and mobilization power and the 
market forces (labor demand and labor supply) have affected the wage bargaining 
process in the Brazilian economy. The discussion of this issue at the current juncture 
becomes relevant as further government deregulation policies are envisaged, 
including the end of the official wage policy for the private sector. Assuming that this 
process of political overture, based on a reduced government participation in the 
economy, reaches not only the market of products, but also the market of factors 
(including there the labor market), the study of the process of nominal wage setting 
can yield valuable subsidies to discuss the course of the country's income policy. 
Therefore, a nominal wage equation is specified in order to capture the government 
participation and the role of institutional and market factors in the wage bargaining of 
two sectors; Manufacturing Industry (representing the organized sector of the 
economy) and Commerce (representing the competitive sector) Institutional factors, 
broadly defined, represent the labor market imperfection in the process of nominal 
wage formation, where the occurrence of "informal agreements" between employers 
and employees would guarantee a different wage level than that which could be 
achieved in a perfectly competitive environment; the market factor, on the other 
hand, indicates how the demand component affects this process. 
' This article is a short version of the Chapter 5 of my M Sc Dissertation presented to the Department of Economics of 
ttie University of Brasilia in 1991. It has been published in the proceedings of the XIX Annual Meeting of the Brazilian 
Economic Association, Curitiba, December 1991 
" M Sc. in Economics by the University of Brasilia (UnB) 
' Readers should be advised that any economic policy implication that our results might suggest do not apply to the 
public sector First because the database used here does not comprise information on government salaries, and second 




Wage equation, bargaining, government intervention. 
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The methodology to be used consists of: (I) running a nominal wage equation for 
the two sectors mentioned above by the usual OLSQ method using monthly data for 
the period 1986-89; (ii) testing if changes in the macroeconomic context observed 
during this period (Cruzado Plan, Bresser Plan and Summer Plan) altered 
significantly the stability of the structural parameters, what is done by means of the 
Chow Test, and (iii) using the Kalman's Filter Algorithm, which is considered a 
powerful tool to verify how the structural parameters behave in a context of 
successive institutional changes 
After this Introduction, the next sections of the paper bring a theoretical 
discussion which will serve as background to explain the specification of the wage 
equation (section 2); the general form of the equation to be run (section 3); the 
specification of the variables, where it will be explained how the measured both the 
government participation and the influence of institutional and market factors in the 
wage setting (section 4); the analysis of the results (section 5); the Chow Test 
(section 6), the Kalman's Filter Algorithm (section 7); and the conclusions (sect. 8). 
2. THE THEORETICAL DEBATE 
This section presents a brief theoretical discussion on the process of nominal 
wage determination, what is considered essential to understand the specification of 
the wage equation to be analyzed next (see section 3). 
It can assumed that up to the end of the 60's, the predominant view in the 
economic literature on employment and wage was that the market played the most 
important role in the wage setting. The base argument was that the salary payable to 
a worker represented the price of his/her work, which, in turn, could be freely 
negotiated in the market (the labor market) as an ordinary commodity and where the 
interaction of the labor demand and labor supply would determine its equilibrium 
price. This idea became stronger in the argument of those who tried to identify a 
trade-off between the rate of change of nominal wages and the unemployment level, 
giving origin to a series of discussions on the existence of the Phillips Curve 
Actually, the debate on the existence of such wage/unemployment trade-off was 
always centered in the classical principles of homogeneity, perfect mobility and 
perfect substitution of labor.^ Firstly, because recognizing labor homogeneity implies 
in accepting that the price of labor is determined by the market (given the constraint 
that no more than one commodity can be associated to each market). Secondly, 
because by assuming perfect mobility, what one supports is that there are no costs 
associated with the transfer of workers from an occupation to the other. And, 
combining, then, homogeneity and perfect mobility, one can conclude that there is 
also perfect labor substitution, what by its turn, ensures that labor can be considered 
an ordinary commodity. It corroborates thus the general idea on the postulated 
trade-off between wages and unemployment 
In the early 70's, however, some papers started to deny these classical 
postulates by admitting some rigidity in the labor market, originating what is now 
called the Dual Labor Market Theories In the line with this new stream of thought, 
the old assumptions of the classical model were replaced by imperfect mobility and 
labor heterogeneity, what allowed to recognize the existence of obstacles associated 
with the mobility of workers (turnover costs) and also that the skills of some workers 
' See R Lipsey(1960) 
could worth something in the labor market 
Thus, institutional factors, understood as the interaction of employers and 
employees in the wage bargaining with the objective of maintaining a stable labor 
force, began to be taken into consideration in the analysis of nominal wage 
determination The role of the bosses on this process would be to keep the labor 
productivity at high levels and reduce the turnover costs (selection and training), 
while workers would struggle for a stable labor force with the aim of reducing the 
competition for jobs and protecting their salaries^ 
3. THE WAGE EQUATION 
After this brief theoretical discussion on the wage setting process, one can 
concentrate now on the wage equation to be estimated. As mentioned before, the 
wage equation to be focused on should capture the government interference as well 
as the influence of both institutional and market factors in the wage setting Its 
general form is as follows; 
LNWi = Boi + BiiLWP + BaLMW + BaLSALDi + B^LDi + z (1 ) 
where: LNWj = rate of change of nominal wages in sector i ; LWP = rate of change of 
the average institutional salary, as defined by the official wage policy; LMW = rate of 
change of the nominal minimum salary, fixed by the government; LSALD; = rate of 
change of the degree of workers' dissatisfaction with their salaries in sector i; LDj = 
unemployment rate in sector i; and Bo = constant term which can represent the 
influence of exogenous factors not reflected by the explanatory variables; it gives 
also an idea of wage floor in each sector.'' The coefficients' expected signals are: 
Bo <0 ; Bi > 0 ; B2 > 0 ; B3 > 0 and B4 < 0. 
For Bi e B2 one can expect positive signals, provided that the government laws 
for the minimum salary and wages in general have always ensured a minimum 
indexation. As for the institutional factors, represented by the degree of 
dissatisfaction (coefficient B3), the expected signal is also positive, what is seen as 
an indication that the higher the lag between the desired and the effective wage (as 
determined by the wage law) the higher the labor mobilization and, therefore, the 
higher the pressure for the wage increases. As one assumes that institutional factors 
act not only through the supply side but also through the demand side, the lag 
between desired and effective wage could yet encourage initiatives from the 
employers' party (demand side) to keep a stable force and, therefore, avoid labor 
turnover and its associated costs; this kind of attitude could also have the objective 
of avoiding a drop in labor productivity in periods of accelerated prices increases, for 
example Finally, the B4 coefficient is expected to be negative since an inverse 
relationship between labor and nominal wages assumed. 
4. SPECIFICATION OF THE VARIABLES 
In the case of government intervention, one can consider that nominal wages are 
strongly affected by economic policy mechanisms, such as the official wage law and 
the government rules for the minimum salary. Thus, the variables capturing this 
influence in the equation (WP and MW) tried to reflect exactly what was determined 
' See the Theories of Labor Market Segmentation, particularly: P Doeringer and M Piore (1971), J Rubery (1978), and 
the most modern version of these theories in A Lindbeck e D Snower (1987) 
•* The constant term could also represent the influence of political factors, such as the labor unions' bargaining power 
by the government. That is, (a) WP is simply an average nominal wage index for the 
formal sector of the economy which is calculated taking into consideration all wage 
laws observed between 1986 and 1989 and weighted by the numbers of workers per 
base-dates (anniversary dates);^ and (b) MW is the official minimum salary in force 
in each month of the considered period. 
The greater difficulty, however, consists in obtaining a reasonable proxy to 
capture the influence of institutional factors in the labor of market It is assumed here 
that the difference between the desired wage (the effective nominal wage adjusted 
for inflation by the labor unions' consumer price index - ICV-DIEESE - assuming that 
it would represented the labor's preferred indexation formula) and the effective wage 
is an adequate proxy.® One of the assumptions in the specification of this variable is 
that workers always try to guarantee their wage peak (the desired wage) during the 
wage bargaining; thus, the more they are mobilized/organized, the higher is their 
power to interfere in the process of nominal wage determination. Therefore, this 
variable can be seen as a proxy for the labor mobilization power (the lower the 
relative difference between the desired and the effective wages, the higher is the 
mobilization power, and vice-versa). As mobilization depends upon certain 
organization, it is reasonable to assume that this variable reflects some relative 
influence of institutional factors by the labor supply side. The theoretical justification 
can be searched in the segmented labor market theories - the idea is that labor 
unionization and organization, in general, allow workers some degree of control; that 
is, organized labor unions could be able to control the entrance of new members or 
even the internal structure of mobility into the firm 
One should yet admit the influence of institutional factors by the labor demand 
side. In this regard, it can be argued that a profit maximizing firm can be also 
interested in keeping both a stable labor force and a high level productivity. Thus, 
the proxy for institutional factors defined above would capture not only the labor 
mobilization power, but also eventual "informal agreements" between employers and 
employees (such as causes of a job tenure, work conditions, salary advances etc.), 
that would seek the stability of the labor force and the labor productivity levels in 
periods of large gaps between the desired and effective wages. 
In the case of the demand component (the market factor), there is no problem in 
assuming that the unemployment rate might represent the labor excess demand; the 
discussion on the Philips Curve provides a theoretical background to justify this 
choice, since it presents a consistent argument on the existence of a trade-off 
between the rate of change in nominal wages and the unemployment level.^ 
5. THE RESULTS 
Initially, the equations were run by the traditional OLSQ method using monthly 
data for period 1986-89. However, the residual presented some auto-correlation, 
which was detected by the Durbin-Watson Test The CORC method was then used 
to obtain coefficients free of auto-correlation The results are summarized in table 1 
bellow (the "L" in the beginning pf each variable indicates its natural log, while the 
"D" in the end indicates moving-average seasonal adjustment). The sources for the 
' S e e F Carneiroe(a/H(1989), 
' A similar specification for the labor's degree of dissatisfaction was originally developed in J M Camargo (1988), 
' See A Undbeckand D Snower (1987), op.cit 
" See R Lipsey (1960), op Cit 
gross data were: (a) the Labor Ministry, which supplied its Hiring Wage Series (Série 
de Salários de Contratação) and the adjustment index for the minimum salary and 
for the overall wage policy, (b) the IBGE, that supplied the data on sectoral 
unemployment 
In broad terms, the results presented the expected signals; that is, positive for 
the wage policy, minimum wage and institutional factors, and negative for the 
unemployment rate. This indicates that there is no apparent inconsistency among 
the data series used that the equation is not misspecified. The regressions' 
explanatory power, represented by the R^, were satisfactory in all equations as well 
as the F and d statistics, confirming the efficiency of the coefficients Concerning the 
t-statistics, the majority of them were significant with 95% of confidence, what means 
that the coefficients are significantly different from zero 
Table 1 - NOMINAL WAGE EQUATIONS PER ACTIVITY SECTORS - PERIOD 1986-1989 
EQ. METHOD SPECIFICATION N R2 DW 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
1 CORC LAITID = 2 48 + 0 47LWP + 0.50LMW + 0 .41LSALD-0 .18LDITD 45 0.995 1 83 
(2 7) (3 7) (4 2) (4 0) (-2 5) 
COMMERCE 
2 CORC LACOMD = 1 48+0 63LWP+0 36LMW+0 46LSALD-0 20LDCOMD 45 0 992 1 98 
(1.5) ' (4.9) (3.0) (3.5) (-1.9) 
(*) Not significant at the 5% level 
The Chow Test is applied in the next section to check for the coefficients stability 
during the period analyzed 
6. THE CHOW TEST 
The Chow Test will be useful to verify in the pattern observed in the analysis of 
the period 1986-89 would be the same if one analyzed different sub-periods 
separately Thus, the original sample was divided in three distinct periods, 
comprising, respectively, the months in which three heterodox stabilization attempts 
were implemented in Brazil (March 1986 to May 1987, Cruzado Plan; June 1987 to 
December 1989, Summer Plan). During the Cruzado Plan, in the first sub-period, the 
wage policy in force was totally different form its predecessor, which allowed wage 
adjustments in six-month intervals Under the new rule, wages began to be 
automatically adjusted whenever the cumulative inflation reached 20% (the so-called 
trigger mechanism). It should be noted that this period was also marked by a 
complete lack of austerity in both monetary and fiscal policies, what ended up 
fomenting a phase of quick economic prosperity accompanied by increases in real 
wages and stability in employment levels. In the second sub-period, the Bresser 
Plan, there were new changes in the command of the economic policy and, 
therefore, in the official wage policy. The trigger mechanism was replaced by a 
geometric average rule which granted wage increases in a quarterly basis based on 
the average inflation of the previous quarter. The Bresser Plan also tried to enforce 
contractionist monetary and fiscal policies, contrarily to what happened in the 
Cruzado Plan, 
In the last sub-period, a new economic team took over and a new heterodox 
stabilization plan was implemented - the Summer Plan, Again, the wage policy was 
altered and wage increases became monthly and differentiated by wage brackets. It 
is worthwhile to mention that the country watched some indefinition concerning the 
salary indexation rules, during this period. From January to May, 1989 the country 
lived without an official wage policy due to the lack of political agreement between 
the Executive and Legislative branches on the new rules to be implemented. Hence, 
as these three intervals the economic policy, and also the wage policy, faced sudden 
changes, it is reasonable to expect that the test of stability of the coefficient might 
indicate structural changes in the estimated parameters. The methodology to be 
applied is the following: for the equations found in table 1, one should test, for each 
set of equations run for the periods defined above, the following hypotheses: 
Ho^  Boi - = Bo; Bn = = Bi, B21 = = B2; B31 = = 83; B41 = = B4 
Hi: Not all coefficients have the same value. 
The first step towards it consists in running, for each activity sector, three new 
wage equations for the new sub-periods. One should then verify whether the sum of 
the square of the residuals for these three new equations are statistically different 
from the total sum of the square of the residuals of the original equation, what is 
done through the F test Thus, in case these two figures are statistically equal, one 
cannot reject the null hypothesis (Ho) and the conclusion is that the coefficients were 
not structurally altered during the period analyzed (or that the data come from a 
homogenous sample).® The equations for the 3 sub-periods can be found in table 2 
As the critical value of Fo.os; 10,30 is 2,16 (note that 10 and 30 refer to the degrees 
of freedom of S;" and SiV°, the ratios Fj (Fi = 2,33 and F2 = 3,04) are sufficient to 
reject Ho and one can, therefore, affirm with 95% of confidence that there were 
structural changes in the estimated parameters; that is, the coefficients are not the 
same in each sub-period of the sample, what places some doubts on the results 
obtained by the OLSQ method 
7. THE KALMAN'S FILTER ALGORITHM 
Provided that the empirical evidence indicated the existence of structural change 
in the parameters for the periods 1986-89, in this section new wage equations will be 
run, but allowing that the parameters vary throughout the time The technique used 
for this purpose consists of an algorithm which makes possible running new 
equations which will have their coefficients updated as one adds an additional 
' The Chow Test consists of calculating the following ratio F, = (S,"/2k)/( / n,+ n2 + nj - 3k); where S = total sum of the 
square of the residual of the equations in each sub-periods; S," = difference between S' and the sum of the square of the 
residual of the original equation; k = number of parameters; and n, = number of observations in each equation One can 
reject H» = if F; is greater then the critical valué of the F distribution 
" The calculation of the degrees of freedom is done as follows: for each sector there is a set with 3 equations with n-k 
d f each (where k = number of explanatory variables); once the sum of the square of the residual is obtained (S,), the 
number of d f becomes n-3k, which is equal to 30 For S,", the difference S, - S¡ leads to (n,+ nz + nj - k) - (n,+ nz + nj -
3k) = 10 Therefore, F has to be observed in the interval between 10 and 30 degrees of freedom 
observation to ttie sample, such technique is knov^ ?n as the Kalman's Filter'' and its 
application to Brazilian problems has barely been tried before '^ 
Table 2 - WAGE EQUATIONS, PER ACTIVITY SECTOR, FOR DIFFERENT SUB-PERIODS 
EQUATION PERIOD R2 DW/ SSR 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
LAITD= - 0 29 + 1 24LWP - 0 08LMW + 0 25LSALD - 0 25LDITD 
(-0 2) (4 5) (-0 3 ) * (2 5) (-2 8) 
LAITD = 4 52 + 0 52LWP - 0 47LMW + 0 07LSALD - 0 6LDITD 
(1 7) (2 3) (2 2) (-0 2 ) - (-0 4 ) -
LAITD = - 3 68 + 1 03LWP - 0 02LMW + 1 03LSALD - 0 10LDITD 
(-2 1) (4 5) (-0 1 ) - (5 1) ( -10) -
LAITD = 2 48 + 0 47LWP - 0 50LMW + 0 41LSALD - 0 18LDITD 
(2 7) (3 7) (4 2) (4 0) (-2 5) 
COMMERCE 
LACOMD = 0 49+1 10LWP+Q 02LMW + 0 22LSALD - 0 24LDCOMD 
( 0 4 ) * (4 2) (0 1 ) - (1 9) (-3 2) 
LACOMD = 3 64+0 63LWP+0 37LMW + 0 06LSALD - 0 29LDCOMD 
(1 5 ) - (2 8) (1 7) (0 2 ) * (-1 0 ) * 
LACOMD= -3 15+0 96LWP+0 03LMW + 1 05LSALD - 0 23LDCOMD 
(-1 7) (4 0) (0 1 ) - (4 4) (-0 9 ) * 
LAC0MD=1 48+0 63LWP+0 36LMW + 0 46LSALD - 0 20LDCOMD 
(1.5)* (4.9) (3.0) (3.5) (-1-8) 
1986M3- 1987M5 0 98 
N = 15 
1987M6-9a8M12 0 99 
N = 18 
1989M1 - 1989M12 0.99 
N = 12 
1986M3- 1989M12 099 
N = 45 
1986M3- 1987M5 0.99 
N = 15 
1987M6- 1988M12 0 99 
N = 18 
1989M1 - 1989M12 0 99 
N = 12 
1986M3- 1989M12 0 99 
N = 45 
2 66 0 0116294 
1 65 0 0367308 
2.43 0 0098326 
1 83 0 1033140 
2.13 0.0110504 
1 75 0 0212422 
2 11 0 0122699 
1 98 0.0897603 
Obs : Equations run using the CORC method (*) Not significant at 95% of confidence 
The Kalman's Filter method assumes as main hypothesis the existence of a 
vector of parameters Bt with length m x 1 which is potentially different in each period 
t As the objective is to search an updating of the coefficients (Bt) based on the 
information available for the previous periods, the vector of coefficients Bt is linked to 
a vector of coefficients of previous periods by means of a transition matrix and also 
to random elements which capture the economy's stochastic moves This pattern of 
evolution of the Bt is characterized as a first order markovian process and can 
justified by the fact of allowing, in a sample way, "the combination of the effect of the 
previous structure with the impact of the random elements over Bt'^ It is worthwhile 
to emphasize that, assuming as plausible a behavioral pattern in which agents learn 
with their previous experience as plausible, changes in economic policy and in the 
macroeconomic, political and institutional context may introduce instability and 
provoke transformation in the structural parameters of economic models''' 
Therefore, adopting a model which assumes constancy of coefficients implies in 
" For a detailed discussion and survey of the literature on the Kalman's Filter see A Mizala and M Bugarin (1988) 
" See, for example, M Bugarin (1989), and A Mizala (1989). 
" A Mizala and M Burgarin (1988), op. cit Page 8 
'•' This observation is based on the criticism of Lucas (1976). On the stability of the structural parameters of economic 
models applied to economies which face "changes in the political context" 
assuming that economic agents do not review their actions before observed changes 
in the macroeconomic context - what seems unlil<ely for the Brazilian economy 
during this period analyzed here. The model can be written as: 
Y, = x, B, + U,. t = 1, ,, Nwi thUt~N(0, Hu,) (A) 
B, = TB,_, + Vf t = 1, ,, N with Vt ~ N (0, Q^t) (B) 
where Yt is the behavioral equation and Bt represents the transition equation, while T 
is the so called transition matrix. 
It is assumed that the vectors Ut and Vt do not present serial and time correlation 
and also there is no correlation between these vectors and the initial states vector. 
What is ignored, however, is the initial structure of the coefficients B and how they 
are dispersed in time. Thus, it is necessary to determine an initial B which might be 
best fitted to the data and to the variance and covariance matrix associated to this B 
(that is, the a priori distribution of vector Bt), After that, one should use the Kalman's 
Filter Algorithm to obtain the a posterior distribution of the vector of states Bt, In 
broad terms, the method of the Kalman's Filter can be divided in two main steps. 
First, one should obtain the better estimator in instant t based on all information 
available up to the instant immediately anterior t - 1 ; thus one can obtain the better 
estimator (Bt), the prediction equation, and also its variance and covariance matrix 
(Pt): 
Bt/t-1 = TBt.,. Vt (C) 
Pt/t-i = T P,.iT' + Qf vt (D) 
Second, after obtaining a new information already available, one should use it to 
update the estimators obtained in the previous step, what is done through the 
following updating equations:^^ 
Bt,., = B„t-i + Pt/t-iX,' (X, Pt/t.iXt' + Ht)-^ et (E) 
withe, = (Yt-X,B,/t.i) 
Pt/t-1 = Pt/M - PM-iXt' (Xt Pvt-iX,' + Ht) Xt Pt/t-1 (F) 
Equations (E) and (F) above are updating equations and the values of Bt/t and Pt/t 
represent the Kalman's Filter estimates. Note that the algorithm consists of: (i) 
obtaining the better estimator up to the instant t-1 (or up to a sub-period of the 
sample) through equations (C) and (D), and (ii) incorporating this new observation to 
the sub-period considered and update the initial states vector through equations (E) 
and (F) New equations were then run for the two activity sectors using the 
methodology of the Kalman's Filter, The results are summarized in table 3, In broad 
terms, the information provided by the last result of the algorithm allowed the 
observation that the institutional factors had a larger relative importance than that of 
the market factor in the equation for the organized sector, while the importance of 
the market factor was relatively greater in the wage bargaining process of the 
competitive sector. 
The fact that the coefficient of the wage policy in the organized sector equation 
was relatively when compare to that for the competitive sector caused some 
surprise. As analyzed in Carneiro (1991),^ ® the government wage policy can be 
" For a mathematical derivation of these equations, see Mizala and Bugarin (1988), op cit 
" See chapter 4 in F G Carneiro (1991) 
considered ineffective in Industry, whicfi indicates some independence from tfie 
government tutelage. Firstly, because the industrial sector where one can find 
internal labor markets, can be easily associated with the idea of labor mobilization. 
As the wage policy consists of an official indexation mechanism which guarantees a 
minimum indexation to salaries in general, the sample obedience to the government 
rules would guarantee some relative importance to this variable in the wage 
equation Therefore, the relatively high coefficient for the wage policy in the case of 
the Manufacturing Industry reflects, basically, the wage indexation and not the 
sector's independence from the government. Secondly, one should also analyze why 
the coefficient of this same variable was relatively less significant in the competitive 
sector. In this case, what can be said is that in this sector it is not so common to 
existence of internal labor markets and also that the lack of organization of the labor 
hand,'added to the lack of a satisfactory degree of qualification, make the workers 
linked to these sectors much more vulnerable to the market forces. Thus, there is 
some room to the practice of labor turnover provided that the tasks usually 
undertaken do not require complex skills This, therefore, would explain the relative 
lower importance of the wage policy in the competitive sectors. 
Table 3 - VARIABLE ELASTICITIES OBTAINED BY THE KALMAN'S FILTER METHOD 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
LAITID = 2 6 + 0 45LWP + 0 52LMW/ + 0 43LSALD - 0 23LDITD R2 = 0 99 
(3 6) (4 1) (5 1) (5 9) (-3 8) DW = 1 5 N = 45 
COMMERCE 
LACOMD = 3 8 + 0 36LWP + 0 61LMW + 0 31LSAD - 0 34LDCOMD R2 = 0 99 
(6,6) (3.7) (7,0) (5.1) ( -45) DW = 1.4 N = 45 
Other result that is not in line with the expected patterns is concerned with 
the relatively high coefficient obtained for the minimum wage in the equation for the 
Manufacturing Industry. The fact that this is an organized sector should be enough 
to ensure a relative independence from the minimum salary. However, the equation 
for the whole set of information seems to indicate the opposite The explanation for 
this particular case will be provided later in the analysis of the path of the variable 
parameters for the organized sectors In broad terms, the results obtained suggest 
that;" (i) the value of the variable elasticities for the two sectors apparently present 
important changes and fluctuations, and (ii) the unique estimator, supplied by the 
OLSQ method, does not illustrate in a satisfactory fashion the changes 
experimented by the elasticities since it represents only an average of the variables' 
standard behavior. The evolution of the coefficients filtered by the Kalman's 
technique can be observed in the accompanying graphs. As affirmed before, the 
filtered paths describe the coefficients' behavior under the assumption that in period 
t there is only a set of information available up to (t-1), that is Bt/n. 
7.1 The organized sector 
Figures 1 to 5 show the filtered path of the variable parameters for the 
" The analysis will start in April 1988 for ttie previous period was used as sub-sample to undertake the first loop 
required by the Kalman's algorithm Thus, the Cruzado Plan period is included in the pool of information required for the 
first loop and, therefore, will not be analyzed in next paragraphs 
Manufacturing Industry,^ ® In the case of the constant term (figure 1), as noted 
before, one can say it gives an Idea of the wage floor and also of the labor 
conquests not reflected by the other variables. In generic terms, there was an 
increase in the importance of the variable parameter representing the constant term, 
which may Indicate that the base salary (or the entry salary level) In Industry 
Increased during the period analyzed, the variable coefficient of the constant term 
started at 0,8 and reached 2.6 by the end of 1989. 
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Figure 2 - MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
Filtered Parameters 
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Wage Policy 
Figures 2 and 3 show the path of variable coefficients which represent the 
government influence in the wage setting As for the wage policy (figure 2), one can 
notice the policy-elasticity ranged from 0 90 to 0 45 indicating that the analysis of the 
wage equation obtained with the whole sample (as in table 3) does not allow the 
The reader should pay attention to the fact that the first three coefficients in each graph did not present a uniform 
behavior and were not, therefore, considered relevant for the analysis 
conclusion that the official wage policy was essential for the industrial sector; 
contrarily, the punctual results provided by the Kalman's Filter (figure 2) show the 
increasing independence of this sector from the official wage policy 
Figure 3 - MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
Filtered Parameters 
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Figure 4 - MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
Filtered Parameters 
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In the case of the nominal wage minimum salary-elasticity, the path described in 
figure 3 allows the return to the discussion on the relative importance of this 
variable, raised in the previous section. As one can observe in the figure, the 
minimum salary coefficient also raged considerably during the period, jumping from 
an initial value of 0.10 up to 0.50 by the end of 1989. Once again, it should be 
argued that the analysis based on the total sample equation, supplied by the OLSQ 
estimate, is short-sighted since it does not reflect adequately the coefficient's 
behavior throughout the period analyzed. A good illustration on this regard is the fact 
that the minimum salary coefficient remained around what one could expect up to 
April 1989 (roughly 0 20), It was only from April on that there was an increase in 
importance for this variable in the Industry wage equation 
But what could explain this change on the path of the minimum salary variable 
elasticity in the organized sector? As mentioned before, given the characteristics of 
this sector, one should expect that such parameter kept the path described for the 
period between April 1988 and April 1989, what would reflect, by its turn, the 
reduced influence of the minimum wage rule in the organized sector's wage setting. 
It is necessary to remember, however, that it was exactly in April 1989 that the 
National Congress approved the new minimum wage law ensuring a bimonthly real 
6.09% increase to this salary. Thus, it is necessary to explain what was the impact of 
this law on the behavior of the firm to understand why there was an increase in the 
minimum salary coefficient in the Industry's wage setting. 
At this point, one should remember that the overall wage policy which was in 
force during this period was considered too complex in operational terms (requiring 
the division of a worker's salary in number of Treasury Bonds so that one could 
apply the specific adjustment index) and that the market practice was already one of 
allowing monthly wage adjustments based on the full inflation rate of the previous 
month, independently from what ruled the government wage law. Thus, as the 
minimum wage rule began to ensure monthly overture for this salary, added to a 
real 6 09% each two months, one can say that there was an approximation between 
what the market had already been doing for a period and what was granted by the 
minimum wage law 
Thus, the increase in the relative importance of the minimum wage variable 
coefficient during this period could be reflected in the fact that the full indexation rule 
allowed to the minimum wage represented almost the same situation already 
observed in the market. Therefore, such "coincidence" allows the inference that what 
became strongly important was the influence of institutional factors in the wage 
setting of the organized sector and not the minimum wage rule. The existence of 
internal labor markets and the presence of strong labor unions with mobilization 
power, contributed, therefore, towards the internalization of an indexation 
mechanism similar to that applied to the minimum salary The analysis of the 
institutional-elasticity shall reinforce this argument 
Regarding the proxy for institutional factors (figure 4), one can also note the 
upward trend of its variable coefficient throughout the period studied, its absolute 
value ranges from 0.33 in July 1988 to 0.43 in December 1989. The path described 
in figure 4 indicates, therefore, that there was an increase in the relative importance 
of institutional factors in Industry. The existence of "informal agreements" between 
employers and employees and also the labor mobilization power became more and 
more important in this sector's wage bargaining process. This could also be seen as 
an indication that internal labor markets became stronger in Industry, since the 
occurrence of such segmentation allows for the influence of institutional factors not 
only by the labor demand side but also by the labor supply side. See also the case 
of the minimum salary variable elasticity discussed above. 
As for the market factor (Fig. 5), there is an erratic change of the coefficients 
around their mean (which was roughly -0 23). The Industry's nominal wage market-
elasticity starts around -0.20, reaches -0.27 and decay to -0 23 As one can see, 
there is a modest change in absolute terms (with an amplitude of just 0.07 units 
between the extreme points), although, by a problem of scale, the figures give the 
opposite impression. But even with a small venation in absolute terms, the market 
factor elasticity showed two distinct moments. The first, between July 1988 and April 
1989, when the coefficient remained steady around -0.19, reflected the reduced 
importance of such variable in the organized sector's wage bargaining. 
The second moment, between April and December 1989, shows a slight increase 
in the degree of importance of the market factor. Once again, one can note that the 
change in the path takes place at the moment of implementation of the new minimum 
salary law. This may be reflecting exactly the effect of labor turnover in the inferior 
scales of the internal market (the secondary internal markets), which are linked to 
the minimum salary in a stronger sense. This period would work in such a fashion 
that as the labor supply increases, because of increases in the minimum salary, the 
firms would observe the appropriate conditions to replace the workers who earn 
salaries next to the minimum salary (say, between 1.2 MWS and 2MW, for example). 
As the importance of these workers in the organized sector is relatively small, the 
effect of labor turnover was translated also in a small amplitude of change of the 
market factor variable elasticity. 
Figure 5 - MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
Filtered Parameters 
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In general, one can say that the Kalman's Filter methodology allowed to confirm 
that institutional factors have been much more relevant than the market factors in the 
wage bargaining process of the Manufacturing Industry. Furthermore, the path of the 
filtered parameters also allowed to verify how the variables behaved before 
institutional changes in the economic environment It was possible to confirm that, in 
Industry, the government intervention in the labor market has been increasingly less 
important to explain the process of nominal wage formation, while the role of 
institutional factors has decreased considerably throughout the time. 
7. THE COMPETITIVE SECTOR 
Figures 6 to 10 show the path of the filtered parameters for the Commerce 
sector. The constant term showed a similar trend when compared to that of the 
organized sector (see figures 1 and 6). As mentioned before, the constant term can 
be interpreted mainly as an indicator of the wage floor of each category, besides 
representing other factors such as possible increase in sl<ills and education. Thus, 
factors such as an increase in the level of skills required to new entrants and the 
new law for the minimum salary approved in 1989 may be raised to explain the wage 
floor increase observed in the competitive sector during the period considered. 
Figure 6 - MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
Filtered Parameters 
Jan/89 f^r 
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Constant 
Concerned to the wage policy, figure 7 shows that, for the competitive sector, this 
variable also lost importance between 1988 and 1989 As mentioned before, this 
could be reflecting some independence of the competitive sectors from the 
government wage policy, what could be caused by the labor turnover mechanism 
Given the characteristics of this sector, which hire cheap labor hand without valuable 
qualifications, the costs associated with the labor turnover could be more than 
compensated if the firm managed to fire employers in the upper wage range and the 
re-hire others who will start in the lower wage range. It should be noted though that 
the period analyzed was marked by a large indefinition on the general indexation 
rules, opening some room for other factors in the wage bargaining. This argument 
will be made stronger later. 
The path described by the minimum salary variable elasticity shows the increase 
importance of this variable in the wage bargaining of the competitive sector (figure 
8) The nominal wage minimum-salary-elasticity jumped from 0.30 in July 1988 to 
roughly 0.60 by the end of 1989. The importance of this parameter is reinforced in 
April 1989 when it was established that the minimum salary would receive real 
increases of 3% monthly (payable, however, in a bimonthly basis) What can be said 
on this regard is that the period of indefinition experimented at that time contributed 
to transform the minimum salary in a leading indicator for the competitive sectors 
increasing, therefore, its importance. What happened, thus, was that the rules 
applied to the minimum salary ended up filing in the gap left by the lack of an overall 
wage policy. 
The competitive sector's institutional-elasticity (figure 9) ranged from 0 24 to 
0.31. Again, one can notice modest variations (also in the range of 0.07 units), 
although the graphs give a false idea of large variations It should be emphasized 
once more that the competitive sectors concentrate the poorly qualified labor hand 
which is, therefore, easily replaceable and faces enormous difficulties to become 
consistently organized. These factors seem to be illustrated in the path described by 
the institutional-elasticity which, besides showing a small amplitude, remained in 
relatively low levels 
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However, as confirmed previously, the period analyzed corresponded to phase of 
large uncertainty in terms of wage policy, besides presenting a picture of rapid 
inflationary acceleration Consequently, a large number of strikes was observed in 
the country, culminating also in a large number of agreements between employers 
and employees Thus, the small increase in importance for the competitive sectors' 
institutional-elasticity seems to suggest that, in these sectors, there was also an 
increase in the mobilization power and organization of the labor hand accompanied 
also by the bosses' higher willingness to negotiate. 
Figure 9 - COMMERCE 
Filtered Parameters 
Jan/80 fipr 






PERIOD: APR/8S TO D E / 8 0 
n UNBidPLOYMENT 
Market Factor 
The nominal wage market-elasticity for the competitive sector reached high 
values, as one should expect, ranging from -0,25 to -0.36 The path described in 
figure 10 shows the importance of the market forces in the competitive sector's 
process of nominal wage determination. Although the amplitude was not that high, 
" See R Maia (1990) 
34 
the coefficients start at a relatively high level (roughly -0,26) and become slightly 
more important in early 1989. In broad terms, one could argue that this behavioral 
pattern can be justified by the fact that these sectors concentrate a more 
homogeneous and unskilled labor hand, what contributes for a higher vulnerability of 
these workers to the market forces. 
8. CONCLUSION 
The preceding analysis has been useful to observe the power of the Kalman's 
Filter algorithm in providing a worth set of empirical information it has also been 
possible to verify that the traditional Ordinary Least Square method is a very limited 
tool to analyze periods of intense changes in the economic-institutional context. The 
use of the Kalman's Filter, on the other hand, allows the observation of how the 
structural parameters change in periods of institutional changes, what is essential in 
the decision taking process. The exercise reported here has found that not only the 
institutional factors but also the market factor were relevant to explain the process of 
nominal wage determination in Brazil between 1986 and 1989, Government 
participation in this process, however, was found increasingly less important. Thus, 
the path of the variable elasticities for both sectors (organized and competitive) 
seems compatible with the overall government speech of implementing the free 
wage negotiation in the country 
Firstly, this argument could be supported by the fact that the wage policy variable 
coefficient showed a decreasing trend in time in all sectors. As mentioned 
previously, this behavioral pattern could be the consequence of several factors, such 
as the own indefinition regarding the overall wage policy, the increased importance 
of institutional agreements and also the utilization of the labor turnover mechanism. 
Secondly, because ttie path of the variable elasticity for the institutional factors 
seems to suggest that the country has watched some progress in the relationship 
between employers and employees 
And finally, because the path of the variable elasticity for the market factor 
seems to indicate that this factor also works as an important mechanism in the wage 
setting of the two sectors. In a higher or lower level, depending on the sector that 
has been considered, market forces seem to become more present in periods of 
increased government intervention, this was verified when both the Summer Plan 
and the benevolent minimum salary law were implemented 
Therefore, the results reported here have demonstrated that the country has 
already the basic conditions to face the free wage negotiation It should be 
acknowledged, however, that the organized sectors present the best environment for 
this practice But there is also evidence on an increased importance of institutional 
factors in both sectors Nevertheless, maintaining an official policy for the minimum 
salary could provide workers employed in competitive sectors with an efficient 
mechanism to protect their salaries 
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SINOPSE 
INTERVENÇÃO DO GOVERNO, FATORES INSTITUCIONAIS E DE MERCADO: UMA ANÁLISE DA 
DETERMINAÇÃO SALARIAL NO BRASIL 
Este artigo analisa o processo de determinação do salário nominal no Brasil Uma equação salahal 
é especif icada para capturar a participação do governo e o papel dos fatores institucionais e do 
mercado na barganha salarial em setores organizados e competit ivos da economia brasileira O teste 
de Chow foi aplicado para resultados preliminares e, então, a equação salarial foi reestimada usando 
o algor i tmo do Filtro de Kalman. As principais conclusões do trabalho são: (a) a política salarial do 
governo tem ficado cada vez menos importante como mecanismo para guiar a determinação salarial 
no Brasil ; (b) o salário mínimo oficial, por outro lado, tem aumentado sua importância na barganha 
salahal; (c) os fatores institucionais têm aumentado de importância na determinação do saláho 
nominal, (d) o fator mercado tem se tornado um mecanismo relevante para guiar a barganha salarial 
no Brasil, 
